



POPULISTS, IDENTITARIANS AND INTEGRALISTS 




Political leaders and academic scholars are paying increased attention to the 
alliance between conservative Christians on the one hand and nationalist-
populist politics on the other. These alliances are by no means new in Western 
history; the twentieth century alone witnesses to a large number of problematic 
alliances of this kind. What is new is the growing popularity of such joint 
ventures in the twenty-first century. Scholars and politicians of my generation 
have been accustomed to consider them as completely outdated currents. Now 
we suddently see that both the young and the elderly, men and women alike, are 
being inspired by nationalist-populist movements and that these movements 
embrace conservative Christianity with much more determination than the 
established political parties.  
       Academic scholars should not offer too quick explanations of this 
phenomenon. We are barely seeing its rough outlines, and declaring it as a 
result of societal change, or as nostalgia or resentment, is not very helpful as 
long as we do not know well enough the actual ideology that sustains the 
phenomenon.1 While my own political leanings are liberal and I am deeply 
worried about national-populist movements, I do not feel that I can present an 
exhaustive intellectual or theological evaluation of their claims. What I can do 
is to lay out an initial documentary survey. The first step towards responsible 
understanding is to study carefully the existing evidence and read the 
scholarship which we already possess.  
      The following presentation proceeds in three steps. First, I show how 
significant populist leaders seek support from conservative Christians for their 
populist-nationalist cause. This is evident in countries like Poland, Hungary, 
and the United States, and we already have some studies which analyse those 
countries.2 I will, however, restrict my discussion to three Nordic countries, that 
is, Norway, Sweden, and Finland. In these countries the coalition between 
conservative Christians and populists is fairly strong, but we do not yet know 
well enough why this is the case. As the societal situation in Scandinavia is very 
different from Hungary or the U.S., the same sociological explanations may not 
apply. 
       Second, while populist politics appeals to large audiences, it is also 
important to see the fundamental intellectual currents behind its Christian-
nationalist rhetorics. For the present, two such currents are visible especially in 
digital environments. The first current, identitarianism, originated in France 




populist parties in France, Italy, Hungary and Germany. Identitarians have also 
many links to Northern Europe and the English-speaking countries. The second 
current, Catholic integralism, has only become visible during the last five years. 
Its current strongholds are located in Poland and the United States. 
     Third, after presenting a survey of these two currents, I will very briefly 
discuss the reactions of some other Christians to the populist movements. I can 
only offer a couple of examples without claiming that they are representative. 
 
I Populist and Christian Causes in Norway, Sweden and Finland 
 
In Norway, Sweden and Finland the growing populist parties are actively 
seeking new supporters from among other conservative citizens. Because of this 
bigger trend, the Christian democratic parties in these three countries need to 
define their own relationship to nationalism and populism. If these currents are 
completely rejected, some conservative Christians may feel neglected and move 
to the populist parties, especially as the populists claim to represent good old 
Christian values. On the other hand, if the Christian democrates adopt a more 
nationalist and populist programme, they may lose other supporters and, more 
importantly, the political opportunities to build coalitions with other parties. In 
Norway, Sweden and Finland, Christian parties are fairly small and need a 
coalition with others to be influential. In all three Nordic countries, 
governments are typically constituted as coalitions of many different parties. 
Collaboration is therefore necessay even when ideologies differ.  
      The Christian Party in Norway (Kristelig Folkeparti, KrF) received 13.7 % 
of votes in the election of 1997 and its leader Kjell Magne Bondevik served as 
prime minister between 1997 and 2005. After that, KrF’s support collapsed. In 
2017. KrF received 4.2 % of all votes. Especially after the European refugee 
crisis of 2015, the Norwegian populist Progress Party (Fremskrittspartiet, Frp) 
has grown. One of its most outspoken representatives has been Sylvi Listhaug 
who was appointed the Minister of Immigration in 2015 and in this capacity 
stopped the wave of immigrants with new and strict policies. 
      Listhaug is a devoted Christian who underlines her religious conviction. She 
thinks that the big majority Church of Norway is too liberal and that even the 
free churches, whose voters are traditionally close to KrF, have betrayed their 
members with liberal and Humanist immigration policies. With Listhaug, Frp 
very programmatically addressed the Christian voters to leave KrF and to find 
their nationalist and Christian values much better taken into account in her own 
populist Frp. In this manner, “a battle for the cross” between these two parties 
takes place in Norway.3  
     Listhaug argues that immigration has become a defining issue which gives 




in different leading positions in Norwegian politics, always criticizing the all-
too-friendly attitudes of other politicians towards Islam and immigration. After 
many turbulent changes and strong statements, the Progress Party is in January 
2020 one of the four bigger parties in Norway, wheras KrF has remained small. 
In her 2018 book, Sylvi Listhaug appears in the cover with a very visible 
Christian cross, arguing that the church in Norway is rottening in its roots. This 
is because the liberal church has become a political arena which no longer 
proclaims Christian faith.4 The Christian party in Norway is struggling with this 
message, as Frp is its natural coalition partner when governments are formed. 
KrF has nevertheless kept distance to straightforward populism.  
      In Sweden, the populist Swedish Democrates party (Sverigedemokraterna, 
SD) has grown significantly and is today one of the bigger parties with about 20 
% share in opinion polls. The SD has a positive view of Christianity as part of 
Sweden’s national heritage. However, its relations with the Church of Sweden 
are tense, as its bishops keep consistent distance to SD.  In the elections, SD has 
often proclaimed that it wants to replace the leftish and liberal trend of the 
majority church with a vision of faith that is conscious of its own tradition.5 
However, the SD does not practice any consistent programme to win Christian 
voters from other parties in the manner of Listhaug in Norway.  
     In December 2014, other Swedish parties made an agreement not to build 
coalitions with SD. For this reason, SD has remained in the opposition until 
today. The formal agreement was, however, already dissolved after nine months 
when the Christian Democrates (Kristdemokraterna, KD) voted against it. 
Among Swedish parties, KD has been the most willing to collaborate with SD. 
Already in the very same day when the December agreement was made, Sara 
Skyttedal, a very visible young politician of KD, wrote that she is against the 
agreement. As leader of the KD between 2013 and 2016, she often argued that 
the KD should adopt stances which are closer to the populist and nationalist 
politics of SD. 
       Skyttedal was also the top candidate of the KD in the European elections of 
2019. The KD received 8.6 % of all votes in this election, the best result ever 
achieved by this small party. Skyttedal’s nationalist course was thus rewarded 
by the Christian Democratic voters. While Skyttedal is more moderate in her 
opinions than Listhaug in Norway, it can be said that under her leadership the 
Swedish Christian Democrates have adopted a political course which brings 
them closer to the populist-nationalist stance.  
      In Finland, the populist Finns’ party (Perussuomalaiset, PS) has also grown 
in recent years and is currently the biggest party with more than 20 % of support 
in opinion polls. The previous leader of the party, Timo Soini, is a devout 
Catholic, and the current vice-leader Laura Huhtasaari is a qualified high-school 




Finnish Christian Democratic Party (Kristillisdemokraatit, KD) is traditionally 
supported by evangelical and free church Christians and has since many years a  
share of about 4 % of all voters. Like its sister parties Norway and Sweden, the 
Finnish KD has an identity crisis, as the populists also support conservative 
values and are winning voters with this politics.  
      For the present, the Finnish KD has not taken a clear stance with regard to 
populism. While the party leader Sari Essayah is very moderate, some other KD 
politicians openly approach the populists. This became evident in April 2019, 
when a group of KD and PS politicans published a joint statement regarding the 
freedom of speech. They claim in the statement that “conservative Christians 
and nationalist friends of the fatherland are discriminated”. In their 
commentaries they stress that their freedom to criticize Islam, immigration and 
gender-neutral marriage has been seriously restricted by the liberals.6 
       In Norway, Sweden and Finland we can thus observe a development in 
which conservative Christians consider that a new coalition between Christian 
Democrates on the one hand and the populist-nationalist movement on the other 
is necessary. This development is motivated by the strong growth of populist 
parties in all three countries as well as by the identity problems of small 
Christian parties. Politically speaking, these trends can be interpreted as moves 
which aim at winning a maximum number of voters.  
      As a theological scholar, I am also interested in the ideological forces and 
constructions which are employed in arguing for these political moves. In an 
earlier paper, I analyse a Finnish online journal, Oikea Media (“the true media”) 
from this perspective. This journal brings together conservatives from PS and 
KD. Many theologians and university teachers are regular contributors to Oikea 
Media, and the journal often treats Christian topics in detail. In its digital 
environment, Oikea Media can be regarded as a think tank which develops 
arguments for the Christian causes in populist-nationalist politics.7 
     One of my essential findings is that Oikea Media uses extensively many 
European sources to find support for these causes. Particularly prominent 
among these sources are the so-called French identitarian thinkers. This was a 
surprise for me, as one does not initially expect that the Finnish populists would 
use French intellectuals to argue for their cause. However, I soon learned that 
the digital environment is a global seedbed for populist thinking. All material is 
easily available in English, and it can be transformed into national language and 
contextualized for the particular environment at hand.  
      This observation leads to the second part of my presentation. The Christian 
populist movements are supported with ideological currents which supply them 
with suitable arguments for the political debate. These currents flourish in the 
digital environment which enables their effective dissemination. In a somewhat 




universalist and multinational. Until now, I have only studied this phenomenon 
as it appears in Finnish digital media, but the role of the internet is probably 
similar in other countries as well. Let us turn to two important ideological 
currents of this kind. 
 
2. Identitarians and Catholic Integralists 
 
The intellectual father of French conservative New Right (Nouvelle Droite, ND) 
is Alain de Benoist. Since the 1970s, he opposes the liberal universalism of 
Western Europe and emphasizes the right to difference. For de Benoist, the 
biggest threat to European countries is the “planetary homogenization” or the 
“ideology of the same” which does not allow room for different identities.8 De 
Benoist’s thinking has inspired many movements against globalism and the 
European Union. The French populist party Front Nationale (nowadays 
Rassemblement Nationale) has transformed these ideas into a defense of nation-
state and traditional national values.  
     In the wake of the new millenium, a more radical movement distinguished 
itself from the ND. This new movement came to called the “identitarians”. 
Guillame Faye’s book Why We Fight: Manifesto of the European Renaissance 
(in French 2001) is regarded as the foundational text of the identitarians. Faye 
advocates ethnocentricism, an ideology claiming that European civilization can 
only survive is the different national identities are taken seriously and 
preserved. Faye’s companion Pierre Vial launched the journal Identité, in which 
thinkers close to Front National party can think about the ethnic dimensions of 
identity. The magazine Terre et Peuple became an even more important organ 
of this movement.9 Since 2003, the so-called Bloc Identitaire has gathered 
French identitarians to present an overall ideology of the movement. Other 
movements, often employing the term identity, have emerged in France, 
Germany and the U.S.10 
      Guillaume Faye’s later book The New Jewish Question (in French 2007) 
moved the anti-globalist front to consider the Islamic immigration as the main 
threat to Europe. Faye argues that the growth of Islamic communities in central 
European countries causes problems that are similar to the so-called Jewish 
question in Nazi Germany. Such comparisons cannot, obviously, be supported 
by political parties, and the identitarians came to be a kind of ideological 
alternative right. They have no voice in populist parties as such, but often their 
ideology and arguments are mentioned by individual politicians. Remarkably, 
the anti-globalist and anti-EU arguments of the identitarians are also used by the 
alternative left. The anti-immigration stance thus serves as an identity marker 




      Another important identitarian book of this kind is Renaud Camus’s The 
Great Replacement (in French 2011) This book launches the idea of a 
transformation of European ethnic proportions. As the Muslim population 
grows much faster and has a much higher birth rate than the European 
civilizations, the Muslims will outnumber Europeans in near future also in the 
European heartlands, Camus claims. This argument, even if politically incorrect, 
continues to be repeated by many European populist politicians.  
     Originally, religion did not play much role in the New Right and 
identitarianism. As the Catholic church is global and supports European Union, 
Catholic thinking was  rather seen as an opponent of ethnocentricism and 
nationalism. Around 2013, this evaluation started to change. Dominique 
Venner, a central figure of the movement, committed a ritual suicide at the altar 
of the Notre Dame of Paris as a protest against the fall of European civilization. 
He became a venerated martyr who connected religious symbols with the 
identitarian movement. At the same time, identitarians and conservative 
Catholics became allies in the opposition against new marriage laws in France. 
They created a joint movement, La Manif pour tous, which employs as its 
symbol a heteronormative family, a father, mother, son and daughter who hold 
hands together.11  
     In the digital environment, this and other similar symbols became memes 
which were adopted by very different conservative movements. In Russia, 
Vladimir Putin’s supporters use this family meme. In Finland, it is adopted by 
conservative Christians who oppose homosexual marriage. Such interactions 
make it easy and natural to disseminate ideas across different nationalist and 
populist movements in Europe. The Swedish activist and publisher Daniel 
Friberg focuses on translating the seminal works of French identitarians into 
English. Friberg’s publishing house Arktos, located in Budapest, spreads this 
material very effectively in paper as well as in the web.12  
     In spite of the recent alliance between identitarians and old-fashioned 
Christians the ideological connections between the two are somewhat artificial. 
Originally, the French New Right was secularist. While Catholics also oppose 
homosexual marriage and defend cultural values, Catholic universalism is 
nevertheless incompatible with the anti-EU and ethnocentric policies of the 
identitarians. Most importantly, the identitarian thinking remains marginal as an 
intellectual achievement. It can produce slogans and memes, but there are not 
many academics who would support it as a serious intellectual programme. 
Identitarians can make provocative statements but populist parties and bigger 
Christian groups cannot adopt their ideology as a whole. Some parts of it, 
especially those related to immigration politics and the growing number of 
Islamic communities in Europe, nevertheless continue to exercise a strong 




      In the last five years, conservative Christian intellectuals have started to 
develop a more ambitious and consistent nationalist ideology. This ideology is 
called Catholic integralism, or simply integralism, and it has found considerable 
support in Poland and the United States. In very simple terms, integralism says 
that the nation-state or the secular power should adapt its laws to the truth of the 
Christian faith. The doctrine was shaped over the centuries in the struggle 
between the pope and the earthly rulers. Its current shape is often compared 
with the so-called Kulturkampf, the culture wars in Prussia one hundred years 
ago. Especially American conservative Christians compare the cultural wars in 
today’s U.S. with the German Kulturkampf, considering that secular liberalism 
should be subordinated to the truth that is available in the Catholic (or 
Protestant) church.13  
     An influential version of new Catholic integralism is outlined in Ryszard 
Legutko’s book The Demon in Democracy.14 Legutko is Professor of 
Philosophy at Jagellonian University in Krakow and a member of the European 
Parliament. He has served as minister in Polish government and represents a 
much higher level of political and intellectual influence than the identitarians 
discussed above. 
      Legutko argues that communism and Lliberalism are like twin brothers or 
two sides of the same coin. Liberalism is as totalitarian as communism and, as 
such, basically intolerant and violent ideology. Both liberalism and communism 
stem from the Enlightenment belief on the reason which inevitably leads all 
humans to a predetermined end. Legutko argues that liberalism only makes lip 
service to freedom and diversity. In reality, its rule of reason demands 
conformism and discriminates those who do not obey others. As liberalism is an 
individualist ideology which destroys home, family and religious communities, 
it leaves the human being completely alone. In such a state, the basic need of 
reason is to conform with others.15 
    Post-Communist societies like Poland have attempted to replace communism 
with liberalism, but Legutko considers that they now realize how liberalism in 
fact destroys the true meaning of humanity and forces everyone to be 
egalitarian. In the end, liberalism is nothing more than ritual and sacramental 
performance of compulsory testimonies: “The liberal-democratic mind, just as 
the mind of any true communist, feels an inner compulsion to manifest its pious 
loyalty to the doctrine. Public life is full of mandatory rituals in which every 
politician, artist, writer, celebrity, teacher or any public figure is willing to 
participate, all to prove that their liberal-democratic creed springs spontaneously 
from the depths of their hearts.”16 
     Legutko defends the government of Viktor Orban in Hungary, as its “mild 
illiberalism” corrects the worst manifestations of liberalism. Like Orban and 




society” ideology as outlined by the philosopher Karl Popper and disseminated 
by Popper’s student, the Hungarian-American investor Geoge Soros. Legutko 
wants to replace contemporary relativism and postmodernism with a 
communitarian vision which affirms the church, the family and other stable 
institutions which can act as true counter-movements to the dangers of 
totalitarianism. He pleads for such conservatism which is no longer found in the 
European Union: “The E.U. is predominantly left-wing, sometimes radically 
left-wing, and erstwhile conservative parties—for instance, the -Christian-
democratic parties of Germany and Italy—have long since capitulated to the 
leftist agenda.”17 
     In his anti-globalism and conservatism, Legutko is fairly similar to the 
French identitarians and the Nordic populists who criticize the local Christians 
for their liberalism. However, Legutko is not a marginal thinker but a politician 
who also exercises a considerable influence in American Catholicism. He 
regularly publishes in First Things, a conservative Catholic magazine which has 
re-launched the theoretical debate on Catholic integralism. 
     Two other academically visible Catholic integralists are Adrian Vermeule, 
Professor of Law in Harvard, and Patrick Deneen, Professor of Political Science 
in Notre Dame University. Deneen makes arguments that are fairly similar to 
those of Legutko. As a Catholic, Deneen considers that Catholics should reject 
liberal forms of life and return to such integralism which makes no 
compromises with the liberal state. Deneen argues that liberalism is intrinsically 
problematic, as its promises of freedom demand strict control mechanisms and 
strict egalitarianism in order to deliver the promises.18  
       Adrian Vermeule converted to Catholicism after having realized that there 
is no middle ground between atheist materialism and Catholic faith.19 He 
opposes what he calls “the relentless aggresion of liberalism” and considers that 
liberal politics is always hostile to the Church in the end. With Deneen and 
Legutko, he thinks liberalism to be a kind of religious heresy which can only be 
counteracted by going back to the roots of the Catholic faith. Vermeule argues 
that Christians should advise political rulers as Christians. For him, this does not 
need to mean nationalist or conservative spirit but something which he labels as 
“strategically Christian.”20 But he does think that liberal governments should be 
replaced with Christian politics which apply Catholic principles simply because 
they are true and manifest the natural law.21  In this sense he is an integralist.  
     While Legutko, Deneen and Vermeule often quote one another and share 
common Catholic conviction as well as common anti-liberal attitude, they may 
differ to some extent with regard to populism and nationalism. In March 2019, 
First Things published a manifesto titled “Against Dead Consensus” which is 
signed by Deneen and fourteen other thinkers (but not by Legutko and 




so-called consensus conservatism which compromises with liberal and 
multicultural values. What is required now is a new sort of conservatism that 
highlights nationalist values.  
       These nationalist values go together with support for President Donald 
Trump’s policies, and the final part of the manifesto therefore states as follows: 
In recent years, some have argued for immigration by saying that 
working-class Americans are less hard-working, less fertile, in some 
sense less worthy than potential immigrants. We oppose attempts to 
displace American citizens. Advancing the common good requires 
standing with, rather than abandoning, our countrymen. They are our 
fellow citizens, not interchangeable economic units. And as Americans 
we owe each other a distinct allegiance and must put each other first. … 
We embrace the new nationalism insofar as it stands against the utopian 
ideal of a borderless world that, in practice, leads to universal tyranny. … 
Whatever else might be said about it, the Trump phenomenon has opened 
up space in which to pose these questions anew. We will guard that space 
jealously.22 
     As integralism is a very recent phenomenon, it is difficult to evaluate it 
properly. One clear conclusion is nevertheless that integralism succeeds in 
creating a position which can be both Catholic and nationalist at the same time. 
In the earlier European discussion, Catholic position has for the most part been 
multicultural and universalist. However, after the criticism of open society and 
liberalism one can say that governments should operate on the basis of Catholic 
principles, giving priority to one’s own nation. Remarkably, the manifesto also 
uses French identitarian rhetorics, for instance, in mentioning the alleged 
fertility of the immigrants and the borderless ideology of the same. 
      While political integralism might work in Poland, it remains theoretical in 
the United States. However, Catholic integralism and the 2019 manifesto make 
it possible for many Catholics to state that the new American nationalism is 
theologically better than the earlier universalism of many Catholic thinkers. 
Given this, Catholics can now say that they must put their American 
countrymen first and oppose immigration. This is no crude nationalism but a 
carefully elaborated version of anti-liberal integralism. Nevertheless, it also 
supports new nationalism as its end result. 
     
 
3. Christian Responses to Conservatism 
 
In August 2019, the manifesto prompted a critical theological response in the 
magazine Commonweal. The response was directed against new nationalism 




Hauerwas, Cornel West, Miroslav Volf and several colleagues of Deneen from 
Notre Dame. The group includes Protestants, Catholics and Orthodox and many 
of signatories are rather non-liberal than liberal in their general theological 
attitude. The discussion has also continued in First Things and the issue of 
nationalism seems to divide American Catholics as well as other theological 
voices. 
      The Commonweal response rejects the kind of nationalism put forward in 
the manifesto. At the same time, the response claims to represent an attitude 
which is nevertheless patriotic, claiming that “nationalism is not the same as 
patriotism. Nationalism forges political belonging out of religious, ethnic, and 
racial identities, loyalties intended to precede and supersede law. Patriotism, by 
contrast, is love of the laws and loyalty to them over leader or party.”23  Such a 
distinction may sound somewhat unusual for European readers, but it needs to 
be understood in its American context.   
     In any case, the Commonweal response shows that nationalism is again a 
debated topic in academic theology. The present paper has shown three distinct 
layers in contemporary discussion on populism and Christianity. First, the 
relationship between populist parties and traditional Christianity, exemplified 
with the help of three Nordic countries, can be approached in terms of political 
opportunism. Second, the identitarian arguments add to this political discussion 
an ideological dimension which needs to be understood and elaborated by 
theologians. However, the French identitarians nevertheless represent a 
marginal position in intellectual and academic terms. While this position may 
move significant electoral groups, it often manifests extremist slogans rather 
than consistent programmes.  
      Third, Catholic integralism as put forward by Legutko, Deneen and 
Vermeule claims to be a serious academic, theological and political alternative. 
Its challenges are only beginning to emerge in the broader debate. It may be, 
however, that this variant is already prominent in countries like Poland and 
Hungary. In Viktor Orban’s government we see a nationalist ideology which 
connects Orban’s own somewhat theocratic Reformed tradition with 
conservative Catholic leanings.24 Such coalition can be supported with the 
arguments of Legutko against liberalism and open society. This third wave is 
not yet visible in Scandinavia, but I would not be very surprised if some of our 
anti-liberal Christian intellectuals receive it in near future. 
      Let me finally return to Western Europe, asking how the established 
churches react to the reality of populist parties. In Germany, one visible debate 
concerns the relationship between the Evangelical Church (EKD) and the 
populist party Alternative für Deutschland (AfD). In 2017, AfD was invited to 
speak at the EKD national gathering, Kirchentag. This created several problems 




the same manner as other democratic parties. This resembles the situation in 
Sweden insofar as the Swedish Archbishop Antje Jackelen has kept a clear 
distance to the populist SD.25 
      In Finland, a similar discussion took place in the preparation of our Church 
Day in 2019. The bishop of Helsinki, Teemu Laajasalo, invited the leader of 
populist PS, Jussi Halla-aho, to a discussion at the Church Day. This decision 
was criticized by many others. However, the discussion took place. Its 
defenders argued that the Finnish policy is to include everyone and that the 
church should not make a priori distinctions between political parties. While the 
Finnish policy can be defended in this manner, it is different from the current 
policies in Sweden and Germany.26  
      The Lutheran World Federation has recently published a very helpful 
volume in which church leaders from Sweden, Germany, Hungary and many 
other countries report on their views and policies regarding populism and 
nationalism. I warmly recommend this book for any further study on this 
challenging theme.27 I also recommend the text “Lutheran Identity”, published 
by the Institute for Ecumenical Research in Strasbourg in 2017.28 This text is 
aware of the complexity and ambivalence of the notion of identity. It outlines an 
inclusive identity which is based on God’s gifts rather than distinctions between 
various ideologies. 
       The present paper wants to be a modest addition to the themes of which 
church leaders are increasingly aware. What I learned from studying Finnish 
populist internet sources is that these movements have their own ideological 
models and thematic areas which may be different from what we learn in our 
otherwise good and solid academic education.  
      It is vitally important to study what digital sources ordinary populists and 
ordinary Christian conservatives use when they discuss matters of liberalism 
and conservatism, or matters of identity, nationalism and globalism. These 
sources may differ from those offered in standard theological education. But 
some of them may nevertheless have considerable global significance and an 
unexpected intellectual appeal. For such reasons, my presentation has focused 
on such relatively unknown movements as identitarianism and integralism. I 
have very consciously left out many much more “populist” currents which we 
encounter in internet discussions. The most popular currents may need to be 
studied with the help of social sciences rather than theology or philosophy.29 
Identitarianism and integralism are relevant for the academic theologians and 
church leaders, as they show how intellectual frames can be added to populist 
and nationalist politics. 
      In my previous paper30 I have shown how Finnish Christian populists 
programmatically use identitarian sources. I cannot say for certain whether this 




sound very similar to their Finnish counterparts. It is also astonishing how 
closely the American and the Polish conservative Catholics are linked to one 
another in their theological argumentation. Other conservative Catholics use 
them as their sources, as the universally available English-speaking digital 
environment makes such use very easy.31 We academic theologians can see the 
genealogies of various discussions, as we have time and opportunity to study 
them in detail. What we can offer to church leaders are, therefore, documentary 
surveys of the existing discussion. With the help of such surveys, church leaders 
can make informed decisions regarding the challenges set by these movements. 
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